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Abstract 
The paper aims at empirically investigating the relationship between regulation and the capital structure of the regulated 
firm, A key aspect of the referred relationship pertains a leverage effect according to which debt could be increased as 
a response to previous physical capital investment with an ultimate goal of inducing higher rates. Theoretical models 
like Spiegel and Spulber [1997, RAND Journal of Economics] highlight that effect. The present paper considers a 
panel data set of local exchange carriers-LECs in the U.S. and investigate Granger causality between changes in long-
term debt (NDEBT) and gross investment (INV) in physical capital. The evidence accruing from a dynamic panel data 
estimation indicates an uni-directional causality from INV to NDEBT and therefore is, to a large extent, consistent 
with a leverage effect and with the notion that the size of the firm´s investment project can impose a restriction on the 
amount of new debt. The result prevails independent of a control variable that indicates the regulatory regime. 
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     1. Introduction 
 
     A relatively small body of literature has emerged in terms of empirical studies on 
the incentive properties of different regulatory regimes. In the context of 
telecommunications, salient aspects include the assessment of productive efficiency 
as given, for example, by Majumdar (1997), Resende (1999, 2000) and Uri (2001) 
and studies on service-quality that include Ai and Sappington (2002), Banerjee 
(2003), and Resende and Façanha (2005). The actual regulatory practice mostly 
revealed a gradual substitution of traditional rate-of-return regulation by regimes 
involving earnings sharing or price caps. The evidence, however, is mixed in what 
concerns the different incentive properties of the different regulatory regimes [see 
Kridel et al. (1996) and Sappington (2002) for an overview of the related issues and 
earlier empirical works]. 
    A different regulatory aspect referring to the impact on capital structure has 
received scarce empirical attention in the literature. Bradley et al. (1984) have 
obtained evidence that regulated industries would appear among the most leveraged 
sectors. Moreover, Bortolotti et al. (2008) investigated a panel of publicly traded 
European utilities and found that firms tended to have a higher leverage if they are 
privately-controlled and if they are regulated by an independent agency. In addition 
to the ownership aspect, the authors obtained evidence that leverage has a positive 
impact on regulated prices. Nevertheless, the literature on the relationship between 
regulation and capital structure concentrates in the theoretical front, and studies by 
Spiegel (1994, 1996) and Spiegel and Spulber (1994, 1997) pinpointed the possible 
relevance of  a leverage effect according to which firm could induce higher rates by 
the regulator. In fact, by becoming more leveraged the regulated firm can induce  a 
more favorable rate setting by the regulator who wants to avoid risks of bankrupcy 
following expressive previous investments in physical capital. Philips (1988) 
suggests that the phenomenon appears to be empirically relevant but a clear 
quantitative investigation is still lacking in the literature. 
    The present paper aims at providing an initial exploratory effort in connection to  
the investigation of the leverage effect. For that purpose, Granger causality tests 
between changes in debt and investment in physical capital are conducted for  a 
panel of local exchange carriers-LECs. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses some conceptual 
aspects referring to the relationship between regulation and capital structure and 
presents the basic aspects of the econometric framework. The third section discusses 
the construction of the data and presents the empirical results for the dynamic panel 
data empirical model. The fourth section brings some final comments. 
 
2.  Regulation and Capital Structure 
2.1- Conceptual aspects 
 The strategic interaction between the regulator and the regulated firm is complex in 
the context of the latter capital structure. A central aspect pertains the relevance of a 
leverage effect that had already been highlighted in the theoretical literature by 
Spiegel (1994, 1996) and Spiegel and Spulber (1994) in the case of symmetric 
information between the parts. The logic of the leverage effect is that the regulated 
firm could have an incentive to become leveraged and ultimately induce a more 
favorable rate setting by the regulator, whereas the latter would be willing to 
accomodate to a certain extent to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy by the firm. 
   The  aforementioned  strategic  relationship becomes even more complex in the 
presence of asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm. Spiegel and Spulber (1997) advance a sequential model that partially builds on 
Banks (1992) and Besanko and Spulber (1992) that highlights the limited 
commitment ability by the regulator that is captured by taking the regulated firm as 
the first mover. The three stages game begins with the regulated firm choosing the 
capital structure in terms of the mix between debt and equity to outside investors 
that will provide funds for investment in physical capital. In the second stage, the 
prices of the firms securities will be defined in the capital market and will also 
reflect expectations associated to the future regulatory policy. In the third stage, the 
regulator will set the rates in acordance with some welfare maximization criterion 
that considers consumer surplus and profits. 
 In addition to the leverage effect, the asymmetric information context brings  a 
complex signalling problem as there are two receivers (regulator and outside 
investors) for which the firm has conflicting incentives. In fact, the firm would like 
to send a positive signal to the capital market so as to indicate low expected costs to 
the outside investors and good profits prospects but also would be willing to signal 
high costs to the regulator so as to induce higher rates. Possible equilibria will 
reflect those various aspects. The present paper intends to conduct an initial 
empirical investigation on aspects favouring the first aspect of the problem, namely 
that of the leverage effect, but of course the theoretical literature warrants a far 
deeper investigation in the future. 
 
2.2- Econometric framework 
     The present application will consider a panel of firms and verify whether there is 
evidence that new debt is caused by gross investment in physical capital. A dynamic 
panel data structure will preclude the utilization of traditional panel data estimators 
given well known biases [for and overview of consistent and efficient estimators for 
dynamic panel data see Baltagi (2001) and Bond (2002)].  
    A simple dynamic model for is given by: 
) 1 ( 1 , it i it t i it v x y y + + + = − µ β α  
The model could also include time effects ( t λ ) that would capture non-observed 
heterogeneities that only depend on the time period and typically are considered by 
means of period dummy variables. The lagged dependent variable induces 
significant biases in traditional panel data estimators and therefore Arellano and 
Bond-AB (1991) have suggested a consistent and efficient estimator for short panels 
based on the first difference of the dynamic model. The estimator is generalized 
method of moment estimator that uses orthogonality condition on the appropriate 
instruments and the error (henceforth GMM-DIF). The first differencing of 
expression (1) would readily lead to: 
) 2 ( 1 , it it t i it v x y y ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − β α  
The lag structure of the equation in differences will reflect the chosen lag structure 
of the equation in levels. The first-differencing transformation therefore eliminates 
the fixed effect. It can be verified that appropriate instruments for   1 , − ∆ t i y  , in terms 
of lagged dependent variable in levels, become increasingly available starting with 
yi1 at  T=3, yi1 and yi2 at T=4 up to yi1, ..., yi,T-2 for T. The remaining elements of the 
instrument matrix will depend on the assumptions regarding additional regressors 
xit. In the simplest case where they are assumed to be strictly exogenous 
(uncorrelated with past, current and future errors) the variables can be readily used 
as instruments whereas in the  case of endogeneity, an instrumenting procedure with 
lagged variables in levels that is analogous to the previous procedure would be 
implemented. The validity of the instruments is important for the consistency of the GMM-DIF estimator. Sargan´s test for overidentifying restrictions in terms of  the 
joint significance of the instruments in excess to the minimum necessary for 
identification and would be distributed as  a chi-square with the number of degrees 
of freedom given by the difference between the number of instruments and the 
number of endogenous variables, under the null hypothesis. Additionally, even in 
the absence of serial correlation for the model in levels, the first-differencing 
procedure would induce first-order serial correlation but not second-order serial 
correlation. Tests for AR(1) and AR(2) were suggested by AB and the latter is 
important to assure adequate properties to the estimator. Under the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation, the test statistics would follow a standard normal 
distribution.  
    The focus of the paper will be on tests for Granger causality. The concept is 
largely widespread since Granger (1969). Let x and y denote two stationary 
stochastic processes, x is said to Granger cause y if the inclusion of past values of x 
help to explain y by reducing the variance of the prediction error, that is: 




p t t t p t t p t t t y y y x x y y y − − − − − − | < | σ σ  
Applications for time series became routine whereas applications for dynamic 
panels data are becoming increasingly common as exemplified by Banerjee (2003) 
in the context of regulation. In operational terms, one runs  a regression of y on past 
values of y and past values of x, and x would cause y if one obtains jointly 
significant coefficients for the lagged x variables. A causality in the opposite 
direction would, of course, be evaluated in terms of the reverse regression and 
assessment of the joint significance of lagged y variables. In the context of the 
present GMM-DIF application, Wald type tests will be conducted. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
3.1- Data Sources 
  The paper relies on different data sources. First, the data on debt and physical 
investment are obtained from the annual report given by the Statistics of 
Communication Common Carriers from the Federal Communications Commission-
FCC. In fact, that is a traditional and comprehensive source for accounting and plant 
data for U.S. local exchange carriers-LECs.  A consistent balanced panel was 
constructed so as to avoid merging problems. The final sample comprised 31 firms 
that are listed in the appendix. The data construction can be summarized as follows: 
. NDEB: defined by the change in long-term debt, where the values were deflated by 
the telecommunications implicit price deflator [1996=100, provided by the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis]. Excluding the possibility of debt renegotiations, the 
change in long-term debt appears to be a sensible  approximation to the change of 
debt more connected with physical capital changes; 
. INV: defined by the change in physical capital as indicated by the change in gross 
communication plant. In the deflating procedure, an average of the 
telecommunications implicit price deflator [1996=100, provided by the U.S. Bureau 
of Economic Analysis] was considered. The averaging process intends to account for 
the presence of different capital vintages coexisting in a given time. The time horizon 
for the calculated average was set in 10 years The weighting scheme considers 
geometrically declining weights given by  (1-δA) where δA stands for the average (across time and firms) of the depreciation rate 
(depreciation expenses divided by communication plant). The procedure is 


































. REG: indicates the proportion of the firm´s activities that is subject to price cap 
regulation. The state level information on regulatory regimes was obtained from 
Abel and Clements (1998). In order to obtain firm-level variables in the case of 
LECs operating in different states, I made use of the number of local loops for the 
firms at state level as provided by the Monitoring Report-FCC. That information 
allowed to generate state-level weights. The procedure had been used by Resende 
and Façanha (2005) and is used here for some additional LECs. The information 
provided by Abel and Clements (1998) that served as the basis of the construction of 
REG led to the focus on the sample period of 1989-1998 after constructing the 
aforementioned variables defined in term of first-differences.  
        The analysis of the U.S. local telephony provides an important potential for 
comparing regulatory regimes that are mostly defined at the state level. 
2  
In the present application, the possibility of controlling for the regulatory regime can 
be interesting given that the more strict controls that prevail under rate-of-return 
could, in principle, induce different impacts on capital structure. The reasons for the 
chosen sample period  
a)  Detailed information on regulatory regimes are only available until 1998 as 
provided by Abel and Clements (1998); 
b)  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the growing penetration of VoIP 
delineates  a more competitive environment a few years after; 
c)  The contrast between regulatory regimes becomes less evident over time as 
price-cap regimes gradually prevail; 
d)  After 1998 the coverage of the referred FCC report displays some reduction as 
some smaller LECs no longer reported data in that publication and also one 
observes the decline of total access lines in the case of some LECs what may 
reflect the possibility that traditional fixed telephony becomes growingly subject 
of alternative competition 
    Altogether, the sample period of 1989-1998 appears as especially relevant for 
establishing suitable controls for the regulatory regime prevailing at the state level. 
 
3.2- Empirical Results 
 Tables 1 and 2 present the results for the two-step GMM-DIF estimation. 
3The 
results were obtained with the software DPD 1.21 that runs in the platform Ox 3.0.  
In order to ascertain desirable properties for the estimator one needs to verify the 
validity of the chosen instruments in terms of the overidentifying Sargan´s test. The 
test assesses the joint significance of the instruments in excess to the minimum 
                                                 
1  A similar procedure was considered by Resende (1999). However, the focus of the analysis of 
the present paper is on changes in gross communication plant as one wants to investigate 
whether changes in debt are induced by changes in physical capital of whatever nature even if it 
involves replacements associated to depreciation. 
2  Previously explored in terms of the construction of a regulatory regime variable as in Resende 
(1999, 2000) and Resende and Façanha (2005) 
3  Small sample corrections for the standard errors were implemented by following the 
procedure advanced by Windmeijer (2005) necessary for identification. As mentioned before, valid instruments would become 
increasingly available in terms of level lagged values starting at lag 2 and including 
subsequent lags. In the present application, lagged levels for ∆NDEB and ∆INV are 
considered for t-2 until  t-4 as instruments as well as the constant, time dummies 
(D94, ..., D98) whenever available, and the regulatory regime variable ∆REG. 
Moreover, the parcimonious choice of the lag structure (at most p = 4) reflected the 
relatively limited number of time periods. The evidence, in all cases, favored the 
non-rejection of the null hypothesis of Sargan´s test and therefore favors the validity 
of the chosen instruments.  
    Moreover, an important diagnostic pertains the assessment of the presence of 
second order serial correlation in the error term. In fact, even in the absence of serial 
correlation in the level model, first-differencing would induce first-order serial 
correlation but not second-order serial correlation. That property is important to 
guarantee the consistency of the GMM-DIF estimator. In all cases, the 
corresponding tests are satisfactory and one cannot reject the null hypothesis of the 
absence of second-order serial correlation.  
    Even though the analysis of specific coefficients is not the focus of the analysis, it 
is possible to highlight some salient results. First, the regulatory regime variable as 
given by ∆REG does not exert any significant effect as  a control in the dynamic 
relationships that include ∆NDEBT and ∆INV. In principle, could be the case that  a 
leverage effect could be more likely to prevail under rate-of-return regulation where 
strategic behavior by the regulated firm could more clearly influence rate-setting. 
However, even under light-handed price-cap regulation the setting of lower 
productivity offset factor X could in principle reflect, to some extent, concerns for 
bankrupcy  in leveraged contexts that extrapolate expected productivity gains. 
  Second, the coefficients of time dummies are often not statiscally significant when 
considered individually.  Table 1 
Causality analysis INV → NDEBT: results from GMM-DIF estimation 
 
Dependent variable: ∆NDEBT  Regressors 
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 


























∆NDEBT-4  - - -  -0.351 
(0.848) 


















∆INV-4  - - -  -0.351 
(0.848) 








D1992  20883.5 
(0.627) 
- - - 












































      
Sargan test   χ
2(39) =18.68 
       (0.998) 
χ
2(31) = 18.35  
             (0.991) 
χ
2(29) = 23.50   
            (0.753) 
χ
2(21) = 15.78  
             (0.782) 
















              Note: p-values are indicated in parentheses 
 
 Table 2 
Causality analysis NDEBT → INV: results from GMM-DIF estimation 
 
Dependent variable: ∆INV  Regressors 
p=1 p=2  p=3  p=4 
Constant  7187.11  

























∆INV-4  - -  - -0.014 
(0.291) 


















∆NDEBT-4  - -  -  0.001 
(0.753) 
∆REG  -6672.62  




(0.376)       
1266.3 
(0.447) 
D1992  -6598.2 
(0.252) 
- -  - 
D1993  -8172.33  




D1994  -7111.28 




(0.242)      
- 
D1995  -4518.52  




(0.885)      
611.234 
(0.484) 
D1996  -5532.19   




(0.562)       
1344.33 
(0.310) 
D1997  -7102.47 




(0.379)      
-789.462 
(0.517) 
D1998  -6621.28  
(0.270)      
293.021 
(0.824) 
913.786   
(0.215)     
1532.77 
(0.024) 
        
Sargan test  χ
2(39) =17.39   
          (0.999) 
χ
2(35) =23.74  
          (0.926) 
χ
2(29) = 19.45  
            (0.909) 
χ
2(21) =18.08  
          (0.644) 
















               Note: p-values are indicated in parentheses 
 
 
Next, I consider joint significant tests that will enable in the end conclusions in terms of 
Granger causality. The corresponding test are presented in table 3. 
 Table 3 
Joint significance tests 
 
Dependent variable: ∆NDEBT  Test 



































      
Dependent variable: ∆INV  Test 
p=1 p=2 p=3 p=4 
overall 
significance 




























Note: p-values are indicated in parentheses 
 
The inspection of table 3 indicates that in all cases overall joint significance prevails 
for the totality of coefficients (excluding the constant). Moreover, joint significance 
prevails for the time dummies in the majority of the cases, 
 Next, one needs to select  a configuration for the lag structure before considering the 
causality tests. The joint significance tests of the coefficients of the  p-th lag favors 
p=2 for regressions in both directions. However, the results are robust for different 
lags. Essentially one observes that past values of  ∆INV are significant in explaining 
∆NDEBT whereas the reverse is not the case. The evidence thus indicate a uni-
directional causality from INV to NDEBT and therefore is in part consistent with  a 
leverage effect and with the notion that the size of the firm´s investment project can 
impose  a restriction on the amount of new debt.  
 
4.  Final Comments 
The paper aimed at investigating the relationship between regulation and the 
capital structure of the regulated firm. Causality tests were carried out between new 
debt (NBEDT) as proxied by change in long-term debt and investment in physical 
capital (INV) as proxied by change in gross communication plant. The evidence 
indicated a uni-directional causality from INV to NDEBT and therefore is consistent 
with a possibly relevant leverage effect. The result is sustained whatever regulatory 
regime prevails at the state level. It appears that even though traditional rate-of-return 
regulation regimes are more strict in their controls than more flexible regimes. The 
paper focused on the change in debt but it would also be interesting to investigate the 
issue of new stock, though the related data is not readily available. 
       The paper aimed at an initial empirical investigation of the topic but an ambitious 
and timely project would be the structural modelling that explicitly considers the role 
of asymmetric information. Empirical studies are still scarce and include, for example, 
Wolak (1994) and Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002). However, technologically dynamic sectors like telecommunications place an important challenge and structural 
investigations on the relationship between regulation and capital structure are still 
absent in the literature. Clearly it is not trivial to empirically disentangle leverage and 
signalling effects in terms of a sound and meaningful theoretical framework.  
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Appendix 1 
List of local exchange carriers-LECs 
 
1) Illinois Bell Telephone Company 
2) Indiana Bell Telephone Company 
3 )Michigan Bell Telephone Company 
4) Ohio Bell Telephone Company 
5) Wisconsin Bell Inc. 
6) Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company 
7) Central Telephone Company of Florida 
8) Verizon Washington D.C. Inc. 
9) Verizon Maryland 
10) Verizon Virginia 
11) Verizon West Virginia 
12) Verizon Delaware 
13) Verizon Pennsylvania 
14) Verizon New Jersey 
15) Verizon New England 
16) Verizon New York 
17) Nevada Bell 
18) Pacific Bell 
19) Southwestern Bell Telephone Company 
20) Cincinatti Bell Telephone Compoany 
21) Southern New England Telephone Company 
22) Central Telephone Company of Virginia 
23) Verizon California Inc. 
24) Verizon Florida Inc. 
25) Verizon Hawaii Inc. 
26) Verizon North Inc. 
27) Verizon Northwest Inc. 
28) Verizon Southwest Inc. 
29) United Telephone Company of Indiana 
30) United Telephone Company of Ohio 
31) United Telephone Company of Pennsylvania 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  